Abstract While many authors have argued that domestic regulatory gaps as well as a lack of international cooperation can at least partly explain the emergence of non-state regulation, this article will focus on an underexplored pathway of emergence linking international, domestic, and non-state regulation. I will argue that even in the presence of a widely supported international agreement, a non-ratifying country can provide the setting for the emergence of non-state certification programs. This will happen when significant domestic legislation on the topics covered by the agreement is absent, and non-state actors are able to act as institutional entrepreneurs with an interest in implementing key elements of this agreement. By tracing the development of certification programs for the electronic waste (e-waste) recycling industry, I will show why the US, more than other countries, provided an enabling environment for the emergence of non-state e-waste recycling certification. The US's failure to ratify the Basel Convention on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and an overall lack of domestic legislation on e-waste exports created regulatory gaps that non-state actors were able to fill. The main global watchdog of the Convention-the US-based Basel Action Network-used certification as a forum-shifting strategy to implement key parts of the Convention in the US. Finally, the article will also show that conflicting interests and divergent perspectives on the legitimacy of the Convention and its rules have led to the development of a competing industry-supported certification program.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, non-state certification programs have emerged as an increasingly popular form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). By developing a set of prescriptive rules and auditing participating firms for compliance to these rules, certification programs aim to induce environmentally and socially friendly corporate behavior, not by relying on the sovereign authority of governments but by providing market-based incentives, such as price premiums and enhanced reputation (Cashore 2002; Vogel 2008; Prakash and Potoski 2006) . Many scholars have argued that such non-state regulation emerges as a response to governmental regulatory gaps as well as to the absence of international cooperation (e.g., Drezner 2007; Green 2010; Cafaggi 2011; Vogel 2009 ). Yet, the existence of a multilateral agreement-even one with near-universal participation-does not, I will argue, preclude the development of non-state regulation dealing with issues addressed by that agreement when regulatory gaps persist in non-ratifying countries.
In this article, I will trace the development of certification programs for the electronic waste (e-waste) recycling industry, which deals with the recycling, refurbishment, and disposal of post-consumer electrical and electronic products, such as mobile phones and computers. Why did e-waste recycling certification programs initially emerge in the United States (US) and not in other countries? And why did they emerge when an existing international agreement-the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal-already covers several of the issues that the certification programs address, most notably the exports of e-waste? The contribution of this article lies in its focus on a heretofore underexplored pathway for the emergence of non-state certification: domestic regulatory gaps in a country that has not ratified an international agreement offer opportunities for non-state actors to attempt to implement key parts of the agreement by means of non-state regulation, such as certification programs; at the same time, key stakeholders' conflicting interests and divergent perspectives on the legitimacy of the relevant international agreement can lead to the emergence of multiple, competing non-state certification programs.
To explain these connections between international, domestic, and non-state regulation in the case of e-waste recycling certification, I will show that while in the US, like in several other countries, legislation has been promulgated on the responsibility of manufacturers and retailers for the take-back of old consumer electronics, the role of the recycling industry has been largely overlooked. In particular, an important topic that is inadequately addressed in the US is the exports of e-waste. While the vast majority of countries are bound by the rules of the Basel Convention, the US is one of only a handful of countries that is not a party to the Convention. Furthermore, domestic legislation on e-waste exports is largely absent. These regulatory gaps have created opportunities for non-state actors with an interest in developing certification programs and the ability to perform the role of institutional entrepreneur to step in. The major global watchdog for the Basel Convention-the Basel Action Network (BAN)-is a US-based non-governmental organization (NGO), which already for 15 years has been advocating for the US to ratify the Basel Convention. BAN has played an important role in the development of e-waste recycling certification, which it has used as a forumshifting strategy. The strong focus of BAN on implementing key elements of the Convention in the US, however, has been at odds with the interests of the main industry lobby. This has led to the emergence of a competing certification program, which has established rules that are less strict than BAN's program. The development of e-waste recycling certification programs thus shows that they are not merely the result of calculated attempts by market actors to improve their shared reputation (Potoski and Prakash 2009 ). Rather, the story below points to power struggles between civil society, industry and the state about appropriate venues for standard setting and the content of these standards (Bartley 2007) .
A focus on the e-waste recycling industry is, furthermore, timely considering the increased attention to the adverse impacts of end-of-life electronic products. Such impacts include low recycling rates, resulting in the loss of valuable materials (Matthews and Matthews 2003; Widmer et al. 2005 ; United Nations Environment Programme 2005); environmental and social externalities of disposal and recycling, such as leakage of toxic chemicals in the soil, air pollution, and health problems due to unsafe disposal and recycling practices (Toxics Link 2003; Smith et al. 2006; Grossman 2006) ; and global justice concerns resulting from (illegal) exports to countries that lack proper recycling facilities (Iles 2004; Pellow 2007; Basel Action Network and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition 2002; Basel Action Network 2005a) . It is estimated that about 40 million tons of e-waste is generated each year worldwide (United Nations Environment Programme 2005; Solving the E-Waste Problem 2012). Recycling rates are generally low. In the US, for example, the e-waste recycling rate was only 19.6 % in 2010 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2011b), while in the European Union (EU), 20-33 % of e-waste was reported as ''collected separately (European Commission 2008 . Data on exports are highly uncertain, yet official sources acknowledge that large amounts of e-waste are exported illegally (European Commission 2008, p. 38 ; US Government Accountability Office 2008), for example, by being hidden alongside other exported goods, or because non-functioning equipment is mislabeled as destined for reuse or recycling (Huisman et al. 2007; Deutsche Umwelthilfe 2007) .
The remainder of this article will proceed in four parts. First, I review and compare the various certification schemes that have been developed for the e-waste recycling industry and explain how these certification programs, which focus on the post-consumer phase, differ from other more well-known programs addressing the production of natural resources and agricultural products. In the second section, I will review the relevant literature on the emergence of non-state certification programs and explain why the e-waste recycling case shows us a novel way in which non-state certification can be complementary to international agreements and fill governmental regulatory gaps. Third, I elaborate on the two main features of the US's situation that, compared to other countries, created an enabling environment for the emergence of non-state e-waste recycling certification programs. The final section will further explore the competitive dynamics within the field of non-state e-waste certification programs and explain the emergence of two competing programs.
2 Non-state certification programs for the e-waste recycling industry
Over the course of 10 years, between 2000 and 2010, three different non-state regulatory programs for the electronics recycling industry were established, two of which are still active (see Table 1 ; Fig. 1 ). The first program-the ''Certified Electronics Recycler'' program-was established in 2000 by the International Association of Electronics Recyclers (IAER), a US-based trade association for the electronics recycling industry. This program, which was terminated in 2009, aimed to improve recycling companies' existing environmental management systems (EMS)-such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard-by adding recycling-specific elements related to the management of hazardous materials from an environmental and worker safety perspective. The program, however, did not evaluate operational or technical performance (International Association of Electronics Recyclers 2007a). In other words, the program merely assessed the existence of a plan to address environmental and social issues at the facility level while not verifying actual on-the-ground behavioral changes. This lack of focus on actual performance is a typical feature of EMSs (Auld et al. 2008, pp. 422-423) and clearly distinguishes the IAER program from the stricter third-party verified performance-based certification programs that emerged later (Conroy 2007, pp. 239, 253) . Since January 14, 2009, IAER has been integrated into the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries (ISRI), the major industry association. As a result, the IAER certification program was phased out on January 1, 2010.
The development of the first performance-based certification program started in 2003 when BAN, in cooperation with the Computer TakeBack Coalition, developed a North America-focused voluntary program called the ''Electronic Recyclers' Pledge of True Stewardship.'' The Pledge contained a set of eight criteria for environmentally and socially responsible recycling, including the prohibition to export hazardous e-waste to developing countries, to use prison labor for e-waste recycling, and to landfill or incinerate hazardous e-waste (e-Stewards 2010d). Before being recognized as ''e-Stewards,'' companies that supported the Pledge were screened by BAN via a ''desk and documentation audit,'' which included examining the company's internal environmental management processes and a verification of the chain of custody of toxic materials (e-Stewards 2011).
1 Between 2008 Although initially not the intention, the R2 process evolved into an initiative that, under the guidance of a facilitator hired by the EPA, established its own certification standard, which was released in October 2008. The standard adds specific e-waste recycling requirements to firms' existing environmental, health, and safety management systems on issues related to environmental performance, worker health and safety, and data protection, yet in less specific and elaborate terms than the e-Stewards standard. As we will see below, a key difference between the two programs is the way they tackle the issue of exports of e-waste to developing countries. It is, furthermore, important to mention that the R2 program is a purely non-state program. R2Solutions, an NGO established in 2010, houses the R2 standard. The EPA was not formally involved in the development of the standard (even though we will see below it did have an influence on the process) and is not involved in running the program. The R2 standard, as its long title suggests, must be used by a recycler in addition to an already accredited EMS. ISRI also offers R2 certification through its dual R2/RIOS certification. RIOS stands for ''Recycling Industry Operating Standard,'' an integrated management system standard for quality, environmental, and health and safety performance. It is a general scrap recycling industry standard that is not specifically geared toward e-waste recycling (Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries 2012). ISRI, however, offers its e-waste recycling members the option of getting certified to both RIOS and R2.
While similar in many respects to existing non-state certification programs for natural resources or agricultural products, certification programs for the e-waste recycling industry do differ in two main respects. First, the locus of certification is different. Whereas for Fig. 1 Time line of the emergence of e-waste recycling certification programs many certification programs (such as forestry, fisheries, labor conditions, or organic agriculture), the regulatory targets are located upstream in the supply chain (i.e., at the production stage), in the case of e-waste recycling, the regulatory targets are located downstream in the post-consumer phase. Three implications follow from this. First, e-waste recycling certification programs do not provide direct incentives to improve the environmental quality of electronic devices or their production processes. Rather, they intend to make the recycling processes of such devices less harmful. Second, these programs, therefore, tackle a different aspect of the e-waste problem than public laws that deal with the organizational and financial aspects of a collection system for e-waste (so-called ''take-back laws''), or laws that prohibit the use of certain hazardous substances in electronic devices, which have been issued in, among others, the EU, China, and several US states (Ongondo et al. 2011 ; Electronics TakeBack Coalition 2011; European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2003; Wright 2007) . Similarly, they differ from voluntary CSR initiatives dealing with take-back or hazardous content that have been established by individual manufacturers and retailers (see, e.g., Greenpeace 2011). Third, the downstream location of certification implies that the regulatory targets are more likely to be located in the consumers' home market. This creates advantages for activists targeting these companies and may more directly influence corporate support for certification. This is different from other areas, such as certain natural resources or labor standards certification programs, for which the regulatory targets are located abroad. In those cases, activists might target companies in the home market to address the sustainability of their suppliers, yet these companies themselves are not the regulatory target of the certification program [except when they need to adhere to supply chain tracking requirements (Auld et al. 2013)] .
A second difference with other certification programs is that there is no on-product label. While in many other issue areas, consumers can buy labeled products, indicating compliance with the standards of a particular certification program, this is not the case for e-waste recycling certification. While each of the programs discussed here does have its own logo, which a recycling company can use to promote its achievements, it will not be found on any consumer product. As a result, demand for electronics recycling certification does not primarily originate from individual consumers, but rather from corporate actors that are obliged by take-back laws, or voluntarily choose, to dispose of their devices in a responsible way, or from large institutional consumers, such as government agencies, that are required to only use certified recyclers. Many scholars have argued that the emergence of non-state regulation can at least partly be attributed to regulatory gaps in governmental policy, which is often linked to changes in the global economy and the diminished regulatory role of states since the last quarter of the twentieth century (Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Cerny 1995; Rosenau 1995; Hall and Biersteker 2002) . Scholars refer in this regard to decreased state capacity to create regulation (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) and the political goal of non-state actors to prevent additional or more stringent public regulation (Abbott and Snidal 2009b; Vogel 2008; Haufler 2001) .
The absence or failure of international cooperation, which is costly and contentious in terms of both negotiation and enforcement of implementation (Abbott and Snidal 2009a, p. 59) , is also identified as providing non-state actors with the opportunity to create regulation and fill the void left by state actors. Drezner (2007, pp. 81-82) , for example, argues that while states are still the dominant actors in creating global regulation, non-state regulation can emerge as a second-best outcome when a large divergence of interests and distributional conflicts among states exist. Similarly, Green (2010, p. 14) argues that private regulation can emerge when there is large heterogeneity of preferences among major states and no focal institution to monitor agents. The development of some of the most well-known examples of non-state certification programs is indeed-at least partlyexplained in this way. The establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council, for example, has been considered a direct response to the International Tropical Timber Association's failure to address tropical timber sustainability and the absence of a multilateral forest convention at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Humphreys 1996; Auld 2009 ). Similarly, programs certifying labor conditions in the apparel industry have been developed, at least partly, as a response to the failure to include labor standards in multilateral trade agreements (Bartley 2003) .
The existence of an international agreement-even one with large membership-does not, however, preclude the emergence of non-state certification programs. A multilateral agreement only takes effect in a country when it has been ratified domestically. Countries that are not a party to an international agreement thus offer fruitful venues for non-state actors to engage in regulatory efforts on issues that are covered by that agreement. Unlike accounts that consider the lack or relative failure of international cooperation as one of the conditions under which non-state regulation can emerge, this article argues that the presence of an international agreement combined with a gap in domestic ratification can also explain the emergence of non-state certification programs as part of a strategy of forum shifting (cf. Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, pp. 564-571; Bartley 2007) . Two conditions are crucial for this to occur. First, the non-party country has not, or insufficiently, developed domestic legislation covering the issues the international agreement aims to tackle. Such a gap in domestic governmental regulation provides non-state actors an opportunity to fill this gap. Second, these non-state actors have an interest in engaging in private rule-making and are willing to act as institutional entrepreneurs (Dimaggio 1988) linking the international and the domestic levels. These interests can be economic, such as when firms consider it beneficial to develop regulation to create a competitive advantage over other firms. They can also be norm driven, for example, when non-state regulation contributes to an NGO's mission statement.
It is not uncommon for non-state regulatory programs to have a close relationship to public regulation. Many private standards require compliance with relevant local, national, and/or international legislation and regulations as a minimum baseline. The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance-a private organization developing standards of good practice for non-state standard-setting organizations-has indeed included such compliance as part of its Standard-setting Code of Good Practice (ISEAL Alliance 2010, p. 15). Non-state regulatory programs can, furthermore, also refer to specific regulations or legislation. In the case of non-state certification programs for labor conditions, for example, all but one of the seven non-state certification programs that have emerged in the US and Europe use the International Labour Organization's (ILO) core conventions as their point of reference and thereby aim to implement these public rules through private standard setting (Fransen 2011; O'Rourke 2003) . For carbon offset certification, Levin et al. (2009) explain that the Gold Standard program-which the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) developed in 2003-emerged in a ''symbiotic'' relationship with the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), as it certifies CDM-approved projects that also address externalities, such as nonclimate environmental or social impacts, that were not included in the original Protocol. In this way, non-state certification programs aim to increase the authority of an existing intergovernmental agreement and complement it by going beyond the agreement's provisions.
While the case of e-waste recycling certification bears some resemblance to these other issue areas, there are two important differences. First, it is indeed the case that the e-Stewards program strives to enhance the authority of an international agreement by adopting the Basel Convention's definitions of hazardous wastes and its key focus on limiting transboundary trade in hazardous waste. However, instead of complementing the Convention, the e-Stewards program principally attempts to enforce compliance with several central elements of the Convention in a non-ratifying country. Second, unlike other cases, contestation around the legitimacy of the relevant international agreement and key actors' conflicting interests regarding the implementation of the agreement's rules underlie the proliferation of non-state certification programs for e-waste recycling. For labor standards certification programs-even those that are business-controlled-the use of the ILO Conventions is not fundamentally contested and such contestation has not formed the basis for the emergence of these programs (Fransen 2011 ). In the e-waste recycling case, in contrast, key actors' divergent perspectives on the legitimacy of the Basel Convention and divergent interests regarding the rules it establishes, in particular regarding exports, have created the space for competing programs to emerge. While one certification program's aim is to ensure compliance with certain elements of the international agreement in a non-ratifying country, other programs can challenge its legitimacy-a position that is after all reinforced by countries' non-ratification of the agreement-and develop a set of competing rules. In this sense, the e-waste case is also different from the Gold Standard's case. Because of the Gold Standard's complementarity with the CDM, Levin et al. (2009) consider it unlikely that competing programs will emerge. Any group attempting to establish a competing program that lacks this close connection to the international agreement, they argue, ''is likely to recognize the advantage enjoyed by the Gold Standard'' and will ''allow the Gold Standard to avoid the downward pressure'' on standards that competition might entail (Levin et al. 2009, p. 790) .
US domestic politics and enabling conditions for the development of e-waste recycling certification
In this section, I will further explain why e-waste recycling certification first emerged in the US and not in other countries. All programs were initially developed as US-specific programs, even though they have gradually spread beyond US borders. For example, by the end of 2012, 313 facilities from 232 companies were R2 certified, of which 284 in the US (R2Solutions 2012a).
3 The e-Stewards program has certified 88 facilities from 39 companies, of which 83 in the US (e-Stewards 2012a), 4 while all but one of 22 facilities certified by the IAER were located in the US (International Association of Electronics Recyclers 2009). In this section, I will explore two enabling conditions that can explain the emergence of e-waste certification in the US: first, a lack of relevant legislation dealing with e-waste recycling, and second, the presence of BAN as a US-based stakeholder.
Legislation dealing with e-waste recycling was completely absent in the US prior to 2003. During the 1990s, several stakeholder dialogues had been initiated by the EPA, such as the Design for Environment program (since 1992) and the Common Sense Initiative's Computers and Electronics Sector Subcommittee (1994-1998) , which focused on, among other things, environmentally friendly design, waste product collection, and environmental reporting. The issue of product collection was more systematically tackled between 2001 and 2004 in the National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), which aimed to develop a national take-back system for electronic products. Due to differences of opinion on financing the take-back operations-whether through consumer fees or producer contributions-such a system was, however, never established (National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative 2004; Grossman 2006, pp. 166-168) . Individual US states have since stepped in to fill this void, starting with California in 2003. Since then, 24 more states have issued take-back laws, some of which include collection or recycling targets (Electronics TakeBack Coalition 2011). The US was certainly not the first country where such laws emerged. Similar legislation had already been promulgated in Japan and Taiwan in 1998 (Ongondo et al. 2011) . Throughout the 1990s, at least six European countries had also adopted legislation on this issue (European Commission 2000, p. 4), while EU-wide legislation followed in 2003 (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2003). Furthermore, individual manufacturers and retailers have also set up collection and take-back systems for their own products (Greenpeace 2011) .
A key feature of these take-back laws and systems, however, is that they mainly focus on the responsibility of manufacturers and retailers in organizing and/or financing the collection of e-waste. Only to a lesser degree do they regulate recyclers' activities, for example, by issuing landfill or incineration bans. More importantly, the e-waste laws issued by US states are unable to tackle an extremely contentious topic: e-waste exports. Export restrictions are a prerogative of the federal level and states are constitutionally not able to regulate in this matter. The federal restrictions that do exist, however, are largely inadequate. In 2006, the EPA finalized the cathode ray tube (CRT) rule, which sets out rules for the export of used CRTs (US Environmental Protection Agency 2011a). These items, as well as circuit boards destined for disposal, however, are the only e-waste items covered under US hazardous waste regulations and as such subject to export restrictions. The vast majority of e-waste can thus be legally exported from the US without any restrictions (US Government Accountability Office 2008, pp. 2, 21-23; 2010, pp. 9-10).
5
This situation is very different from the majority of other countries that unlike the US have ratified the Basel Convention. This multilateral agreement, which has near-universal membership with 180 parties, regulates the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, which include many e-waste components. The Convention, inter alia, prohibits parties to export hazardous wastes to parties that have prohibited their import, or when they cannot be handled in an environmentally sound manner. Parties are also not allowed to export hazardous wastes to or import them from a non-party, unless under a bilateral, multilateral, or regional arrangement with equivalent provisions. Exports are allowed, however, when the exporting state does not have the capacity to dispose of the wastes in an environmentally sound manner, or when the wastes are required as raw material for recycling or recovery industries. While the Convention was initially merely focused on the disposal of hazardous wastes, a 1995 amendment-the so-called Ban Amendment-prohibits the export of all hazardous wastes covered by the Convention for purposes of final disposal, reuse, recycling, and recovery from Annex VII countries [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and EU countries, and Lichtenstein] to all other countries. The Ban Amendment has not yet entered into force due to years of legal disagreement among parties on the number of ratifications needed (Secretariat of the Basel Convention 2008, pp. [51] [52] [114] [115] , 6 yet 74 countries have already ratified the amendment.
The US is one of only three countries that have signed but not ratified the Convention and is the only non-party OECD country. Since signing the Convention in 1990, every US administration has purportedly been supportive of ratification (Choksi 2001, pp. 527-531; Interagency Task Force on Electronics Stewardship 2011, pp. 29-30) . 7 In 1992, the US Senate even provided its advice and consent to ratification (US Environmental Protection Agency 2012, p. 30; Interagency Task Force on Electronics Stewardship 2011). Several attempts were made to pass legislation, yet none were successful due to Congressional and industry opposition to restricting international trade, especially for recycling purposes (Choksi 2001; Clapp 2001, pp. 75-77) . The second factor facilitating the emergence of e-waste recycling certification programs in the US is the role of BAN as institutional entrepreneur. BAN is a Seattle-based NGO, which, as its name suggests, serves as the main global watchdog of the Basel Convention. It is a strong proponent of the Convention's Ban Amendment, and since the early 2000s, it has been particularly instrumental in focusing attention on the detrimental environmental and social effects of e-waste exports to developing countries through its own investigative research. standards and which has led to the development of two competing programs. These dynamics will be further discussed in the next section.
Competition dynamics in the field of non-state certification programs
The three programs that have emergence since 2000, and the two programs that are still active today, differ in several respects, as shown in Table 1 . The two most important elements are the way hazardous waste is defined and the permissibility of exports. These two elements are inherently linked to the main actors' divergent perspectives on Basel Convention obligations. By early 2008, this resulted in a split between BAN, on the one hand, and ISRI and the EPA, on the other. The dynamics underlying this split will be explained below. The IAER's EMS standard was developed in 2000 as a response to findings from an industry survey indicating there was a market demand for best management practices for the relatively young yet fast-growing e-waste recycling industry (Muscanelli 2004) . As mentioned, however, very few facilities actually got certified. Two factors can mainly account for this lack of support: exports and accreditation. First, industry actors have indicated that the IAER's lack of attention to a controversial issue like exports constrained the program's development (HessTech 2009). 10 The standard, for example, only mentioned that exports ''should be conducted in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations,'' with the definition of relevant materials being limited to those designated as ''hazardous'' by ''applicable laws and regulations'' (International Association of Electronics Recyclers 2007b). The IAER at the time realized its standard was not far-reaching enough. It argued that the standard could have been updated and improved over time and believed that too high expectations from stakeholders hindered support for the program (Muscanelli 2004) . Second, business' lack of support has also been attributed to the absence of accreditation of the IAER program's third-party auditor [Bureau Veritas Quality International (BVQI)] by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)-American Society for Quality (ASQ) National Accreditation Board (ANAB). Stakeholders have used this to delegitimize the program and divert support to the other programs.
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When BAN's e-Stewards Pledge program was launched in 2003, its intention to use the Basel Convention as its main reference point was immediately clear. The program from the beginning focused on: (1) implementing the Basel Convention Ban Amendment; (2) using the hazardous waste definitions as provided in the Convention; and (3) promoting the development of recycling capacity at home, as stipulated in the Convention (Basel Action Network 2005b, pp. 2-4). The exposure of illegal e-waste exports to Asian countries in its own investigative reports and the absence of US legislation and industry standards (like IAER's program, or manufacturers' voluntary take-back programs) to prevent such exports served as direct justifications for the development of the Pledge program (Basel Action Network 2005b, pp. 1-2). BAN was supported in its efforts by several industry actors who preferred recycling e-waste domestically in order to reap the profits from the domestic supply of e-waste and thus supported the e-Stewards' focus on an export ban for toxic e-waste.
12 Furthermore, as the e-Stewards program explicitly used the Basel Convention's definitions of hazardous waste, it was much stricter than the IAER program. The latter, as mentioned, only covered materials considered hazardous by ''applicable laws and regulations,'' which in the US meant that most e-wastes were excluded.
The e-Stewards program's strong allegiance to the Basel Convention also became evident during the development of the R2 standard. BAN was in fact a participating stakeholder in the R2 negotiations. The R2 process was initially triggered by a meeting in March 2005 that the EPA convened to discuss issues related to e-waste. One of the issues that emerged from this meeting was a demand for the EPA to pursue compliance by electronics recyclers with existing laws and regulations. 13 This was a clear gap at the time. Even though the EPA did have a voluntary program focusing on e-waste-the Plug-In to eCycling program-this public-private partnership was aimed at increasing electronic products take-back and recycling by manufacturers and retailers, yet did not cover recycling companies (Renckens 2008 ; US Government Accountability Office 2010, p. 13). BAN participated in the R2 meetings up until the spring of 2008. While participating, BAN had put its own efforts of transforming the Pledge program into a third-party audited certification program on hold in order to fully support the R2 process, which had as its explicit goal the development of one standard that could be supported by all relevant stakeholders. BAN pulled out of the R2 initiative, however, due to disagreement with industry representatives and the EPA. The chasm occurred when the R2 multi-stakeholder group decided to field test a draft R2 standard, which, according to BAN, would knowingly violate international rules. The disagreement over this decision revealed key differences on the interpretation of the Basel Convention, such as the conditions under which certain components can be considered hazardous waste, and which items can be exported for reuse purposes, and thus legally imported by parties to the Convention when the items originate from a non-party (e-Stewards 2010a).
14 As a result of this disagreement, BAN left the R2 negotiations and fully committed to establishing its own, competing certification program. A similar difference of opinion between BAN and the majority of the recycling industry on the interpretation of the Convention, as well as the support from the EPA for industry's position, had occurred before as well. In the Mobile Phone Partnership Initiative (MPPI)-a public-private partnership under the Basel Convention established in 2002 to developed voluntary technical guidelines on the environmentally sound management of used and endof-life mobile phones-the US has sided with industry against the position of BAN and several parties to the Convention regarding the conditions for mobile phone exports for reuse purposes (Mobile Phone Working Group 2006; Wuttke 2006). 15 This conflict between BAN and the other R2 stakeholders indicates the importance of problem definition and the underlying vested interests. BAN is ultimately focused on the implementation of the Basel Convention and defines the e-waste problem from the perspective of global justice and the negative environmental and health externalities of illegal exports and unsafe recycling. Industry representatives, like ISRI, and the EPA, on the other hand, define the issue in terms of materials recovery and economic efficiency, within which waste trade has a clear economic role. As is evident from the discussion above, this stance has informed the US's position toward the Basel Convention as well as (the absence of) the development of domestic regulation, be it in the form of formal legislation or a certification standard.
Conclusion
While many scholars have argued that non-state certification programs can emerge as a result of both failed or absent governmental regulation and international cooperation, the case of e-waste recycling certification shows that even when an international agreement with widespread membership exists, non-state regulation covering problems dealt with under the agreement can still emerge. This article has argued that non-state regulation can in particular fill domestic regulatory lacunas in a state that has not ratified the international agreement. In this way, non-state regulation can play an intermediary role between the international and domestic levels. BAN's e-Stewards program was a response to the US's non-ratification of the Basel Convention and the inadequacy of domestic legislation and industry standards to deal with illegal e-waste exports. The e-Stewards program from the start aimed to implement key parts of the Basel Convention in the US, which conflicted with the interests of the main industry representatives and the EPA, resulting in the development of two competing certification programs.
It remains to be seen to what extent e-waste recycling certification will be able to take root outside the US. Established to be used globally, these programs do add important elements to existing public e-waste legislation in countries that have ratified the Basel Convention or which have promulgated legislation dealing with collection and take-back of e-waste, hazardous content of electronic devices, or recycling practices. For example, they add a focus on data security, prison labor, and worker health and safety issues. Even so, this article has illustrated an important and underexplored mechanism through which non-state regulation can link the international and the domestic level by means of forum shifting. It shows more than anything else that non-state regulation should not be studied in isolation, but in relation to existing public regulation at multiple political levels.
